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N six separate occasions, a nine-year-old child was released from
her school during the school day into the custody of an unidenti-
fied adult male, who then raped her and returned her to school.'
In Doe v. Covington County School District, the Fifth Circuit held that
the student ("Jane Doe") had not established a constitutional claim
against the school district because she lacked a special relationship with
the school district under DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services.2 While the decision comports with Fifth Circuit and sister
circuit precedent, it is premised on a flawed characterization of the school
environment and an excessively narrow reading of DeShaney that seems
motivated more by a desire to limit liability than an actual analysis of the
case at hand. Unless and until the Supreme Court overrules the ex-
tremely narrow reading of the DeShaney special relationship exception
that is consistently applied in all circuits that have addressed the issue,
public schools will be essentially immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions,
no matter how egregious the school's inaction toward the student's safety
when threatened by outside actors.
The Covington County School District promulgated a policy whereby
school officials were permitted to release a student to an adult without
verifying the adult's identity or ensuring that the adult was listed on the
"Permission to Check-Out" form filled out by the student's parent or
guardian.3 Under this policy, the school released nine-year-old Jane Doe
on six separate occasions to an adult male whose identity was never
checked, even though he repeatedly signed her out as her father and once
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1. Doe v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. (Covington III), 675 F.3d 849, 853 (5th Cir.
2012).
2. Id. at 852.
3. Id. at 853.
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as her mother.4 The school also failed to check the permission form.5 On
each of these occasions, the man took Jane Doe off school property,
raped her, then returned her to school.6
Jane Doe, along with her father and grandmother, sued the school dis-
trict, its board, its superintendent, and various other defendants for con-
stitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and
Mississippi tort law. 7 Only the § 1983 claim and special relationship the-
ory are addressed in this Note. The district court granted the defendants'
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that the
plaintiffs had not sufficiently pleaded a constitutional violation based on
the special relationship exception.8 Initially, a Fifth Circuit panel re-
versed, holding that the plaintiffs pleaded a plausible substantive due pro-
cess violation because the compulsory attendance laws and affirmative
action of placing Jane Doe in her molester's custody created a special
relationship under DeShaney.9
On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the judgment
of the initial panel and affirmed the district court's ruling granting the
motion to dismiss.' 0 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily
on DeShaney, where the Supreme Court addressed what duty, if any, the
Due Process Clause creates for the state to protect individuals from each
other." "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that '[n]o State shall . .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law."' 12 The language of the Due Process
Clause, said the Court, "cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirma-
tive obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to
harm through other means."' 3 In that case, four-year-old Joshua
Deshaney's father beat him so severely that Joshua was left permanently
and severely retarded. 14 Joshua's mother sued the state on due process
grounds claiming the state had failed to protect Joshua from his father's
beatings, even though they knew of the danger.15 The Court held that
Joshua's mother had not alleged a constitutional violation because the
Due Process Clause imposes no affirmative duty on the government to





8. Doe v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. (Covington 1), 637 F. Supp. 2d 392, 395 (S.D.
Miss. 2009).
9. Doe v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. (Covington II), 649 F.3d 335, 366 (5th Cir.
2011).
10. Id. at 852.
11. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96
(1989).
12. Id. at 194-95.
13. See id. at 195.
14. Id. at 193.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 196-97.
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"special relationship" exception, which requires the state to protect a citi-
zen when the state maintains custody of the citizen against his will, de-
priving him of his ability to provide for his own basic needs, as in cases of
incarceration and involuntary institutionalization. 7
Writing for a majority in Covington, Judge King took a very narrow
view of the special relationship exception from DeShaney, limiting the
exception only to those cases specifically recognized by DeShaney and in
the context of foster children.18 Quoting DeShaney, Judge King explained
that a special relationship is created only "when the State takes a person
into its custody and holds him there against his will."1 9 She further used
the DeShaney reasoning, stating "when the State by the affirmative exer-
cise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him
unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his
basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and rea-
sonable safety"-it breaches the boundaries set by the Due Process
Clause.20 Finding none of the characteristics of a DeShaney special rela-
tionship, the court held that neither in this case, nor in any other case, do
compulsory attendance laws create a special relationship between a
school and its students.21
The majority cited numerous decisions from the Fifth Circuit and sister
circuits to explain why no special relationship exists between public
schools and their students, but discussed two Fifth Circuit en banc deci-
sions at length.22 First, the court discussed Walton v. Alexander.23 In that
case, the court found no special relationship existed between a residential
public school for deaf children and a student.24 The court adhered to a
strict and literal reading of DeShaney so as not to expand the words of
the Due Process Clause.25 Only under "extreme circumstances," where
the state severely restricts a person's liberty so that he cannot provide for
his own basic needs, is there a special relationship.26 The court next dis-
cussed Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School District, where it distin-
guished compulsory school attendance from the enumerated special
relationships from DeShaney because "the custody is intermittent, the
student returns home each day, and the parents remain the primary
source for the basic needs of their children." 27 Thus, the court in Coving-
ton found that the school did not take and hold Jane Doe against her
17. Id. at 198-200.
18. Covington III, 675 F.3d 849, 855-56 (5th Cir. 2012).
19. Id. at 856.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 858.
22. Id. at 856-58.
23. Id. at 856-57. In Walton, a student was sexually assaulted by a fellow student while
attending a residential public school for the deaf. In its analysis, the court noted that the
victim attended voluntarily and could leave at will. Id. at 856.
24. Covington III, 675 F.3d at 856.
25. Id. at 856-57.
26. Id. at 857.
27. Id. In Hillsboro, a janitor sexually assaulted a student who had been kept after
school and sent to a remote part of the school on an errand for her teacher. Id.
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will. 2 8 Jane Doe was "not attending the school through the 'affirmative
exercise of state power,"' but rather was attending voluntarily as one way
to fulfill her schooling requirement. 29
Unlike the majority in Covington, the dissent focused not on whether a
public school can ever have a special relationship with a student, but in-
stead on the effect Jane Doe's young age and isolation from classmates
should have on the analysis.30 Judge Wiener cited to Ingraham v. Wright
to support the position that very young students who are unable to leave
the school's custody freely and who are isolated from teachers and pupils
do have a special relationship with the school.3 ' He refuted the majority's
assertion that any age distinction is "arbitrary" by explaining that schools
exercise significantly greater control over a nine-year-old child than over
older children.32 This control, he wrote, coupled with the inability of
young children to protect themselves and the isolation of Jane Doe, cre-
ated the special relationship.33
The court's holding in Covington certainly comports with Fifth Circuit
precedent. 34 As Judge Jolly pointed out in his concurrence, this was the
third time that the en banc court had addressed the precise question of
whether a special relationship existed between public schools and stu-
dents.35 In those cases, the court unequivocally held that students, as vol-
untary attendees of the school capable of providing for their own basic
needs, are not owed a duty of protection by the school from the danger of
nonschool actors. 36 Thus, the significance of Covington lies not in any
additional analysis or change in position, but in the clarity with which it
displays the faults of the entire line of post-DeShaney precedent.
According to the concurrence in Walton, "it is clear that the DeShaney
court did not foreclose 'special relationships' in all cases of non-incarcer-
ated and non-institutionalized persons . . . . The majority's holding that
custody must be 'involuntary' and 'against [a person's] will' is so restric-
tive that it precludes any type of custody short of incarceration or institu-
tionalization giving rise to the duty of protection."37 The concurrence
continues, "such a narrow application of this duty clearly was not contem-
plated in DeShaney."38 By explaining that "incarceration, institutionaliza-
tion, or other similar restraint of personal liberty" can trigger the special
relationship, the DeShaney Court indicated that the special relationship
extends to more situations than Covington allowed. 39 The school-student
28. Id. at 861.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 877-78 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 877 (citing 430 U.S. 651 (1977)).
32. Id. at 877-79.
33. Id. at 877-78, 880-81.
34. See id. at 856-58 (majority opinion).
35. Id. at 870 (Jolly, J., concurring).
36. Id.
37. Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1307-08 (5th Cir. 1995).
38. Id. at 1308.
39. Id. at 1307.
[Vol. 66388
Due Process-Fifth Circuit
relationship, when accurately characterized, meets this threshold of "sim-
ilar restraint of personal liberty" envisioned in DeShaney.40 The Coving-
ton court, however, distorted the reality of the school-student
relationship, producing the bizarre result that a school has no duty to
protect students from third-party harm, even though the law mandates
attendance.41
The court's analysis centered on the school environment's distinction
from the enumerated situations as an open environment with voluntary
attendance.42 Two issues become immediately apparent. First, the school
environment is anything but open. Students, particularly at Jane Doe's
young age, are not free to leave the school campus as they please.43 Ele-
mentary schools, middle schools, and many high schools would stop a
student attempting simply to walk off campus. Even at a school that al-
lowed older students to leave campus as they please, students likely must
have permission either at the beginning of the year or on a case-by-case
basis. Thus, the court mischaracterized the school as an open
environment.
The second issue arises from the court's position that school attendance
is voluntary. A student has no freedom under the law simply to decline to
attend school, with or without a parent's permission.44 The majority at-
tempted to defuse this argument by mentioning that parents may choose
alternative educational options for their children. 45 Judge Wiener ad-
dressed this hollow consolation in his dissent, quoting Judge Edith Jones
in Johnson v. Dallas Independent School District: "To say that student
attendance is voluntary because parents may elect to home-school their
children or send then to a private school is lamentably, for most parents,
a myth." 46 In the case at bar, the court dismissed this point after only a
cursory consideration. 47 Regardless, "by requiring that the State take a
person into custody involuntarily before gaining a duty to protect that
person, the majority has arbitrarily limited due process rights in a way
that cannot accurately reflect the nature of the custodial control actually
exercised by the State." 48 Thus, "rather than simply asking whether a per-
son entered state custody 'voluntarily,' we should examine the nature of
the custodial relationship that existed between the State and the
plaintiff." 49
40. See id.
41. Covington III, 675 F.3d at 863.
42. Id. at 861.
43. Id. at 879 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 878-79.
45. Id. at 861 (majority opinion).
46. Id. at 878 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (citing 88 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1994)),
47. See id. at 861 (majority opinion) ("It may well be true that, for the vast majority of
parents in Mississippi, the only way for them to fulfill their obligation is to enroll their
children in public school. But that practicality does not alter the fact that Jane's parents
voluntarily sent her to the school as a means of fulfilling their obligation to educate her.").




Both of these faults led to errors in the circuit's custody analysis. The
court maintained that parents retain custody of their children while at
school and are still responsible for their basic needs.50 This is false. Par-
ents are not in a better, or even as good of a position to protect the child
while at school.5 ' The majority attempted to offset this point by borrow-
ing language from the Hillsboro decision explaining how school is differ-
ent from the recognized special relationships: unlike prison or
involuntary commitment, school requires only intermittent custody be-
cause children return home at night and can ask their parents for help or
protection. 52 These distinctions are of little importance and indeed would
provide little comfort to Jane Doe's parents. It is absurd to think that
somehow the intermittent nature of school attendance absolves schools
from liability for the rape of a child during school hours or the murder of
a student at the hands of a school shooter. In neither of these cases would
the harm be prevented by returning home at the end of the day.
DeShaney should not allow a school to turn the other way while a student
is harmed, particularly when a school actor facilitated the harm through a
deficient policy.
Judge Jones wrote in Hillsboro, "I have noted the incongruity and shal-
low logic underlying the distinction between children in public schools
and those who are involuntarily confined full-time . . . . Nevertheless, I
concur in this en banc outcome not because the legal distinction has sud-
denly become persuasive but because there is no realistic alternative."53
This desire to limit liability likewise appears to be the ulterior rationale in
Covington. Covington is but one in a long line of cases in the Fifth Circuit
and others interpreting the special relationship exception so narrowly.54
This focus on efficiency and limiting liability at the expense of vindicating
a fundamental constitutional right is inconsistent with the spirit of
DeShaney.
50. Covington III, 675 F.3d at 861.
51. Id. at 879 (Wiener, J., dissenting); see also Walton, 44 F.3d at 1309.
52. Covington III, 675 F.3d at 857. Notably, in all three of these cases the circuit panel
first held that the school did have a special relationship with the student before the en banc
court vacated these decisions.
53. Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1417 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Jones, J., concurring).
54. See Covington III, 675 F.3d at 856-57.
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